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NOTE 
Statutory Requirements for Artificial Insemination: A Sperm 
Donor's Fight to Let Go of His Rights 
Benjamin T. Forman* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, an auto-mechanic from Topeka, Kansas by the name of 
William Marotta answered a Craigslist ad posted by Angela Bauer and 
Jennifer Schreiner, a lesbian couple seeking a private sperm donor for 
artificial insemination.1 After discussing the issue with his wife, Marotta 
arranged a meeting with the couple and agreed to donate. The parties then 
signed a contractual agreement intended to sever Marotta's parental rights and 
relieve him of any future child support obligations.2 Once the agreement was 
signed, Marotta produced a sperm sample and delivered it to the couple's 
                                                             
* Articles Editor, Volume 9, Pittsburgh Journal of Environmental and 
Public Health Law; Candidate for J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of 
Law, 2015. I would like to thank the staff members of the Pittsburgh Journal 
of Environmental and Public Health Law for their tireless efforts in preparing 
this note for publication. I would also like to thank my parents, Judith and 
Jonathan, for their never-ending support and guidance. 
1 Heather Hollingsworth & John Hanna, Kansas Sperm Donor Law On 
Child Support Payment Is Outdated: Attorney, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 3, 
2013, 10:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/03/kansas-sperm-
donor-law_n_2404170.html. 
2 See Jim Doblin & Matthew DeLuca, Kansas judge hears arguments in 
case of sperm donor sued for child support, NBCNEWS.COM (Nov. 16, 2013, 
8:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kansas-judge-hears-
arguments-case-sperm-donor-sued-child-support-v21150280. 
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home in a plastic container.3 After that, he left. The couple agreed that 
Schreiner would be the child's birth-mother, and after just one attempt, the 
artificial insemination proved successful and resulted in the birth of baby 
girl.4 At no time during the process was a physician consulted.5 
While Marotta's motivations were indeed benevolent, what appeared to 
be a selfless act of kindness spawned a precarious legal situation that could 
possibly render him responsible for future child support payments. This is 
because the Kansas statute governing paternity determinations requires the 
use of a physician for donors to relinquish parental rights and financial 
obligations.6 After the birth of the child, Schreiner and Bauer eventually 
separated, and due to an injury that rendered Schreiner unable to work, she 
applied for state assistance to help care for the child.7 In order to receive 
assistance, however, the Kansas Department for Children and Families 
required her to provide the identity of the child's father.8 She told the state 
that Marotta provided the sperm for the artificial insemination, but that he 
was only a donor and that they had signed a contract precluding him from 
ever having to make child support payments. Regardless, the state of Kansas 
sought an order seeking to recover $6,000 from Marotta to offset the costs of 
the assistance to Schreiner.9 
                                                             
3 Hollingsworth & Hanna, supra note 1. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (2013) ("The donor of semen 
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman 
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth father 
. . . unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman."). 
7 Hollingsworth & Hanna, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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The state argues that since no physician was used in the artificial 
insemination, it has a legal right to seek reimbursement from Marotta as the 
father, regardless of the contractual agreement between himself and the 
couple. Marotta's attorney, by contrast, says that the contract should be 
honored nonetheless. He believes the Kansas law is outdated, and points to 
laws in nine other states which say that donors cannot be the legal parents of 
children conceived through artificial reproduction.10 Kansas, on the other 
hand, argues that at least 10 other states require the involvement of a 
physician in order to absolve sperm donors of child support obligations.11 
Both Marotta and the state motioned for summary judgment in October of 
2013, and after hearing arguments from both sides, the Shawnee County 
District Court issued an order granting the state's motion and declaring 
Marotta the legal father of the child.12 
This case, which Marotta plans to appeal, offers a paradigm that 
highlights the complex legal issues arising from the practice of unassisted, at-
home artificial insemination. The venue for the showdown could not be more 
appropriate, as Kansas is no stranger to the debate over the rights of sperm 
donors. In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of its 
paternity statute when a donor attempted to assert his parental rights after 
donating sperm to a friend.13 That case, however, did not involve a contract 
between the mother and the donor, and unlike the Marotta case, the parties 
used a physician to perform the artificial insemination.14 The use of a private 
                                                             
10 Heather Hollingsworth & John Hanna, Sperm Donor Legal Issues 
Highlighted by Kansas Case, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2013, 3:11 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/04/sperm-donor_n_2408580.html. 
11 Id. 
12 Kansas ex rel. Sec'y Dep't for Children & Families v. W.M., Case No. 
12 D 2686 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Jan. 22, 2014) (memorandum decision and order 
granting petitioner's motion for summary judgment). 
13 See In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025 (Kan. 2007). 
14 See id. 
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donor without physician assistance adds another level of complexity in the 
Marotta case, and also creates an issue of first impression in Kansas. 
In an effort to raise awareness to the legal obstacles often faced by 
private sperm donors and same-sex couples, this note examines the different 
approaches courts often take in resolving paternity issues, and recommends a 
two-part solution that alleviates public policy concerns. Part I of this note 
explores the history and purposes of the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 and 
its subsequent amendments in 2002. Part II focuses on states that have not 
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act's 2002 amendments and examines 
paternity decisions involving private sperm donation within those states. Part 
III, by contrast, seeks to examine court decisions in states that have adopted 
the amendments to the UPA. Part IV continues by discussing the policy 
arguments in favor of and against unassisted, at-home artificial insemination. 
Finally, Part V recommends that states adopt the 2002 amendments to the 
UPA and enact regulations that effectively track donations from private 
sperm donors. 
I. CHANGING SOCIETAL ROLES AND THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
As social views on same-sex relationships evolve and reproductive 
technologies rapidly advance, the need for a clear understanding of state 
parentage laws is crucial for all parties involved in assisted reproduction. One 
of the more recurrent issues that has inundated courts in disputes over 
parentage is whether the source of sperm used for artificial reproduction is 
considered a father, with full parental rights and financial obligations, or a 
donor, where parental rights and financial obligations can be waived. Several 
scenarios can materialize that give rise to legal issues hinging on a biological 
father's status as one or the other. For instance, it could be the case that a 
biological father wishes to claim parental rights and accept financial 
obligations after donating sperm to a same-sex couple. By contrast, it could 
also be the case that the biological father wishes waive his parental rights and 
be absolved of financial obligations. Such situations have been further 
complicated by the existence of preconception contracts purporting to 
relinquish parental rights, especially in cases where the biological father 
seeks to invalidate the contract and assert parenthood. 
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The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
("Commissioners") attempted to simplify issues of parentage in 1973 with the 
drafting of the Uniform Parentage Act, which sought to address antiquated 
notions of parent-child relationships under the common law.15 The 
Commissioners envisioned a body of law that granted support rights to 
children regardless of the marital status of their parents, a concept that was 
largely absent from the common law prior to 1973.16 Most states enacted 
provisions of the Act in one form or another, which signaled a revolution in 
the law of parentage determination, paternity actions, and child support.17 As 
time progressed, however, advances in technology—namely the development 
of DNA identification—prompted a call for greater modernization of state 
parentage laws.18 
In 2000, the Commissioners drafted several revisions to the Uniform 
Parentage Act, which combined parts of the 1973 version with two other Acts 
that had previously been drafted to address various parentage issues.19 One 
important change was noted in Section 702, which states that "[a] donor is not 
a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction."20 This 
section of the new UPA represents a marked change from the 1973 version, 
which stated that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for 
use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife 
is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby 
                                                             
15 See Parentage Act Summary, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
16 See id. 
17 BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
PROBLEMS 1360 (7th ed. 2013). 
18 See Parentage Act Summary, supra note 15. 
19 In 1988, the National Conference of Commissioners drafted the 
Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act and the Uniform 
Putative and Unknown Father's Act. 
20 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 (2000) (amended 2002). 
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conceived."21 The removal of the physician requirement precludes donors of 
any kind from being able to sue for paternity status, thus providing certainty 
of non-parentage for prospective donors.22 
II. STATUTORY MANDATES FOR PHYSICIAN INVOLVEMENT IN 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
As of the date of this note, the 2002 amendments to the UPA have been 
adopted in only nine states.23 The natural consequence has been that a 
majority of state courts still require physician involvement in artificial 
insemination in order for a paternal father to relinquish his paternity rights 
and to relieve him of child support obligations. In these states, arguments in 
favor of donor status when at-home artificial insemination is performed are 
likely to fail, as courts are reluctant to interpret the plain language of the 1973 
UPA as anything but an absolute requirement that a physician be involved.24 
Several cases illuminate this concept. 
The 1986 case of Jhordan C. v. Mary K. draws striking parallels to the 
Marotta case and showcases the emphasis that courts place on statutory 
language in disputes over parentage. Jhordan C. involved a California 
woman, Mary K., who decided to conceive through artificial insemination 
                                                             
21 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 407 (1973) (repealed 2000). 
22 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 cmt. (2000) 
(amended 2002). 
23 The Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, which was amended in 2002, has 
been adopted in Alabama, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
24 See, e.g., E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2011); see also, e.g., Mintz v. Zoernig, 198 P.3d 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
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with the plan of raising the child jointly with her friend, Victoria.25 After 
consulting various acquaintances and interviewing several potential donors, 
Mary K. and Victoria ultimately decided on Jhordan C.26 Over a period of six 
months, Jhordan C. provided multiple sperm samples to Mary K. in the 
privacy of her home, and after several attempts, the artificial insemination 
was successful.27 After the child's birth, Mary K. allowed Jhordan C. to visit 
the child on approximately five separate occasions.28 However, she quickly 
terminated the visits and attempted to induce Jhordan C. to sign a contract 
indicating that he would not seek paternity rights.29 Jhordan C. refused and 
subsequently initiated an action to establish both paternity and visitation 
rights.30 The court ultimately held for Jhordan C., reasoning that Mary K. had 
"omitted to invoke" the California paternity statute by failing to utilize a 
licensed physician in the artificial insemination.31 
At the time Jhordan C. was decided, the California statute governing the 
paternity of sperm donors stated that a "donor of semen provided to a 
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the 
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child 
thereby conceived."32 As the court noted, the statutory language of the 
                                                             
25 Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 390. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (California's statutory code has since been 
amended, and the current statute states: "The donor of semen provided to a 
licensed physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted 
reproduction of a woman other than the donor's spouse is treated in law as if 
he were not the natural parent of a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise 
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California parentage statute was taken almost verbatim from the 1973 UPA.33 
Mary K. argued that the drafters of the UPA incorrectly assumed that all 
artificial inseminations would occur under the supervision of a physician, and 
that the language was merely suggestive as opposed to mandatory.34 
The court, however, was not persuaded. In rejecting Mary K.'s 
argument, it noted that the initial discussion draft of the UPA did not contain 
a provision pertaining to physicians, and that "[its] eventual inclusion . . . in 
the final version of the UPA suggests a conscious decision to require 
physician involvement."35 The court went on to say that the "[California] 
[l]egislature ha[d] embraced the apparently conscious decision by the drafters 
of the UPA to limit application of the donor nonpaternity provision to 
instances in which semen is provided to a licensed physician." While the 
court gave considerable merit to Mary K.'s arguments, they were not enough 
to trump the intent of the legislature. 
E.E. v. O.M.G.R. is a similar case from New Jersey involving a single 
woman, E.E., who wanted to have a child but did not want to assume the 
added expense of going through a physician.36 As an alternative, E.E. enlisted 
the services of a friend, O.M.G.R., who produced a sperm sample that was 
"transported to its intended location [via] kitchen turkey baster."37 Unlike the 
case of Jhordan C., the parties in E.E. drafted a consent order that purported 
to surrender all paternity rights and relinquish all financial obligations of 
O.M.G.R.38 The order was signed by both parties and submitted to the court 
                                                                                                                              
agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and the woman prior to the 
conception of the child." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613.). 
33 Jhordan C., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 392. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 393. 
36 E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 20 A.3d 1171, 1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
2011). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 74 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) Ɣ DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.78 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Volume 9 Issue 1 
Winter 2014 
after the child was born.39 Similar to the case of Jhordan C., the New Jersey 
statute governing the parentage of sperm donors contained a physician 
requirement.40 Thus, the court was left with the issue as to whether a written 
contract could circumvent the physician requirement in the statute.41 
As this was an issue of first impression in New Jersey, the court sought 
guidance in Jhordan C. and In re K.M.H., and held that termination of 
O.M.G.R.'s parental rights could not be accomplished by contract.42 In 
rejecting the contract's validity, the court placed a tremendous amount of 
emphasis on the language of New Jersey's parentage statute43 in the same 
manner as the court in Jhordan C. The court also invoked its stated principle 
                                                             
39 Id. 
40 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (The statute states: "Unless the donor of 
semen and the woman have entered into a written contract to the contrary, the 
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he 
were not the father of a child thereby conceived and shall have no rights or 
duties stemming from the conception of a child."). 
41 E.E., 20 A.3d at 1172. 
42 Id. at 1173. 
43 See id. at 1176 (The court states the following: "Our Supreme Court 
has consistently he that the best indicators of legislative intent are the plain 
words of the statute. . . . In reviewing the statutory language, courts should 
'ascribe to the statutory words their ordinary meaning and significance, and 
read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the 
legislation as a whole.' . . . The Court has cautioned against '[]rewrit[ing] a 
plainly-written enactment of the Legislature or presum[ing] that the 
Legislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the plain 
language.[]' . . . The court notes that the New Jersey Legislature, in enacting 
the UPA, could have removed the requirement of a licensed physician, as 
other states have done."). 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 75 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) Ɣ DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.78 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Statutory Requirements  
Winter 2014 
that "a child's relationship with his or her parents is so significant that all 
doubts are to be resolved against the destruction of that relationship."44 
III. DONOR STATUS IN STATES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE PHYSICIAN 
ASSISTANCE IN ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
On the other hand, states that have either adopted the 2002 version of 
the UPA or omitted the physician requirement have tended to favor donor 
status in at-home artificial inseminations. 
A.A.B. v. B.O.C. is a Florida case from May of 2013 involving a lesbian 
couple, A.A.B. and S.C., who decided to conceive a child using the sperm of 
S.C.'s brother, B.O.C.45 In this case, the parties made an oral agreement that 
B.O.C. would not assume a parental role in the child's life.46 After three 
attempts using a home artificial insemination kit, A.A.B. conceived.47 
However, after three years of raising the child together, the couple ended their 
relationship and A.A.B. refused to allow S.C. to have any further contact with 
their child.48 Notwithstanding his oral agreement to not assume a parental 
role, B.O.C. filed suit to establish paternity and visitation rights after his 
sister and A.A.B. parted ways.49 The trial court held that since the parties 
employed a do-it-yourself procedure of artificial insemination rather than 
engaging a physician, Florida's statute did not apply and S.C. could claim 
paternity rights.50 
                                                             
44 Id. at 1173. 
45 A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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A.A.B. appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to find that 
B.O.C. was a donor within the meaning of Florida's donor statute.51 Although 
Florida has not yet adopted the 2002 amendments to the Uniform Parentage 
Act, its donor statute is similar in that it lacks the provision requiring 
physician involvement included in the 1973 version of the UPA.52 The 
appellate court found the plain language of Florida's statute dispositive, and 
as a result, it reversed the trial court's decision, holding that "[b]ecause 
B.O.C. was a sperm donor he relinquished his paternal rights and obligations 
to [the child]."53 
Another case in which the court upheld the relinquishment of donor 
rights is the Texas case of In re H.C.S. Similar to A.A.B. v. B.O.C., this case 
involved a lesbian couple, K.D. and Marie, who wanted to have a child and 
decided to use sperm from Marie's brother, J.S., to impregnate K.D.54 Similar 
to A.A.B. v. B.O.C., the couple broke up after the child was born and J.S. filed 
suit to establish paternity rights.55 K.D. disputed the lawsuit and argued that, 
as a sperm donor, J.S. lacked standing to file suit under Texas Family Code, 
and that the court thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.56 
J.S., on the other hand, argued that he did in fact have standing based on 
another Texas statute, which provided that "a proceeding to adjudicate 
                                                             
51 A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d at 762. 
52 FLA. STAT. § 742.14 (2013) (Florida's parentage statute states: "The 
donor of any egg, sperm, or preembryo, other than the commissioning couple 
or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption agreement under s. 
63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and obligations with 
respect to the donation or the resulting children. Only reasonable 
compensation directly related to the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos 
shall be permitted."). 
53 A.A.B., 112 So. 3d at 764. 
54 In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d 33, 34 (Tex. App. 2006). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
J o u r n a l  o f  E n v i r o n m e n t a l  
a n d  P u b l i c  H e a l t h  L a w  
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 77 
 
ISSN 2164-7976 (online) Ɣ DOI 10.5195/pjephl.2014.78 
http://pjephl.law.pitt.edu 
Statutory Requirements  
Winter 2014 
parentage may be maintained by . . . a man whose paternity of the child is to 
be adjudicated. . . ."57 
In support of his argument, J.S. relied on an earlier Texas case which 
concluded that donor status was irrelevant in deciding whether a man 
bringing suit to establish paternity has standing.58 The court in this case 
declined to agree, however, saying that J.S.'s argument ignored the statutory 
language addressing his donor status,59 which Texas had adopted as a result 
of the amendments in the 2002 UPA.60 The court then emphasized the impact 
that J.S.'s interpretation of the statute would have on the financial and 
emotional status of children and their mothers: 
[U]nder J.S.'s reading of the Family Code, any alleged 
donor—even one who does not know the mother or one 
who donates to a sperm bank—could challenge paternity 
in an original proceeding. Rather than promoting assisted 
reproduction, such a course of action would subject 
children born of assisted reproduction and their mothers 
to the financial and emotional costs of defending suits 
like this one on the merits.61 
IV. RELEVANT POLICY ISSUES IMPLICATED IN DISCUSSING AT-HOME 
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 
The use of known sperm donors in artificial insemination inevitably 
raises public health concerns. However, it also provides a valuable public 
service to women and couples who might otherwise be precluded from 
having children. The following section examines these countervailing issues 
                                                             
57 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.602(3) (West 2013). 
58 See In re Sullivan, 157 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex. App. 2005) (disagreed 
with in In re H.C.S.). 
59 See In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d at 36. 
60 See Parentage Act, supra note 23. 
61 In re H.C.S., 219 S.W.3d at 36. 
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in detail, and seeks to explore some of the underlying forces that might be 
driving state resistance to changes in public policy. 
A. DOES UNREGULATED, PRIVATE SPERM DONATION FROM 
KNOWN DONORS POSE SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC HEALTH 
RISKS? 
An important factor to consider in discussing the merits of unassisted, 
at-home artificial insemination is whether it poses any significant public 
health risks. One concern that has gained a fair amount of traction in the 
debate is the high frequency with which individual donors often choose to 
donate, and the potential for adverse consequences that can result. 
Take for instance the case of Cynthia Daily, a social worker from the 
state of Washington. Roughly ten years ago, Daily and her partner decided to 
use a sperm donor to conceive a child, with the hopes that the child would 
one day be able to meet some of his siblings.62 After conceiving, the couple 
used a website to track the number of children fathered by their son's donor, 
and as the years went on, they watched the number of siblings grow to 150.63 
While this particular group of donor children is among the largest of its kind, 
similar groups of 50 or more siblings are cropping up on internet web sites 
and chat groups across the United States, as more women choose to have 
children on their own.64 
Another noteworthy example is the case of Trent Arsenault, a computer 
security engineer from San Francisco, CA. In 2010, Arsenault caught the 
attention of the Food and Drug Administration when he began routinely 
donating his sperm to women he met through a Yahoo Group called 
                                                             
62 Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/06/health/06donor.html. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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FreeSpermDonors.65 Although sperm is considered neither a food nor drug, 
the FDA's Center for Biologistics Evaluation and Research regulates those 
who commercialize in donation, with the purpose of curbing the spread of 
communicable diseases.66 While the FDA generally focuses its attention on 
traditional sperm banks and not on private donors, Arsenault was particularly 
public about his activities. Once the FDA caught wind of his operation, it 
convinced him to agree that he was a legal "establishment" and sent agents to 
his home to interview him and to obtain records on his activities. By that 
time, he had already made a total of 340 donations to 36 separate recipients.67 
The FDA determined that Arsenault had not been screening for diseases often 
enough and issued a cease-manufacture order prohibiting him from making 
further donations.68 However, an advocacy group filed a brief with the FDA 
on Arsenault's behalf, and as a result, the cease-manufacture order was 
suspended.69 As of February of 2012, Arsenault had tallied more than 500 
donations.70 
Cases such as these inevitably raise public health concerns, and as a 
result, a growing voice has emerged among parents, donors, and medical 
experts regarding the possibility that rare genetic diseases could be spread 
more widely throughout the population.71 While it is possible to mitigate 
some of the risks by requiring the donor to undergo comprehensive medical 
                                                             
65 Benjamin Wallace, The Virgin Father, N.Y. MAG. (Feb. 5, 2012), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/trent-arsenault-2012-2. 
66 Id. 
67 It is worth noting that not all of Arsenault's donations have proven 
successful. As of February, 2012, Arsenault's donations accounted for a total 
of 14 pregnancies. Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Wallace, supra note 65. 
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screening,72 self-administered testing might not be as effective in ensuring the 
healthiest specimen possible when compared to the benefits of using a 
physician. 
Courts have taken notice of this concern as well. In Jhordan C., for 
example, the California Court of Appeal noted that "a physician can obtain a 
complete medical history of the donor (which may be of crucial importance 
to the child during his or her lifetime) and screen the donor for any hereditary 
or communicable diseases."73 The court went on to reference a comment in 
the original version of the UPA, which cites a law review article arguing that 
health considerations should require physician involvement for statutorily 
authorized artificial insemination.74 According to the court, the inclusion of 
the reference in the comment suggests that "health considerations underlie the 
decision by the drafters of the UPA to include the physician requirement in 
the artificial insemination statute."75 
In the Interest of R.C., a 1989 case in the Supreme Court of Colorado, 
echoes the same sentiment as Jhordan C. The concurrence is particularly 
illuminating because it references a specific set of guidelines for screening 
donor sperm, which have been promulgated by the American Fertility 
Society, the American Association of Tissue Banks, and the Council of 
                                                             
72 See, e.g., Lesbian Insemination, OUR WORLD TOO, http:// 
ourworldtoo.com/lesbian-insemination/#sperm_banks (last visited Feb. 7, 
2014). The website states: "[t]here may be some real disadvantages you must 
consider before forging ahead. Your known donor may have some 
communicable disease you are not aware of or be a carrier for a genetic 
disease such as cystic fibrosis. SO HAVE ANY DONOR TESTED 
THOROUGHLY regardless of how well you know him." 
73 Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 393. 
74 Id. (citing Walter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of 
a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 777, 803 (1970)). 
75 Id. 
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Ethical & Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association.76 The 
American Fertility Society guidelines are summarized in a case footnote as 
follows: 
[The guidelines] recommend extensive infectious disease 
testing. They also recommend rejecting prospective 
donors or surrogates with a family history of nontrivial 
malformation, nontrivial Mendelian disorders, or a 
chromosomal rearrangement (unless the donor or 
surrogate has a normal karyotype). The donor or 
surrogate should not have (or have had) any disease with 
a known or reliably indicated major genetic component, 
such as asthma, juvenile diabetes mellitus, epileptic 
disorder, hypertension, a psychosis, rheumatoid arthritis, 
or a severe refractive disorder. The guidelines 
recommend screening donors for autosomal recessive 
disorders known to be prevalent in their ethnic group, 
and rejecting carriers. In addition to these definite 
reasons for rejection, there are certain conditions in 
relatives that should be considered as reasons for 
rejection (major psychoses, epileptic disorders, juvenile 
diabetes mellitus, and early coronary disease, mental 
retardation, neurologic disorders, unexplained deaths 
under age thirty, or significant congenital defects).77 
There is also the concern that such a high number of half-siblings in a 
concentrated geographic area could increase the risk of accidental incest 
between half-brothers and half-sisters.78 The issue is compounded by the fact 
                                                             
76 In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1989). 
77 Id. at 37 n.3 (citing Lori B. Andrews, Legal Aspects of Assisted 
Reproduction, 541 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 668, 672 (1988)). 
78 See Mroz, supra note 62. 
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that, although mothers of donor children are encouraged to report births, there 
is no requirement to do so.79 
B. WHAT ABOUT THE BENEFITS? 
Despite the plethora of arguments against the practice of at-home 
artificial insemination, several reasons exist that may prompt would-be 
mothers to eschew commercial sperm banks and opt for private sperm 
donation from private, known donors. 
One of the more prevalent considerations involved in the decision to 
choose a private donor is the cost of fertility treatment. Fertility services can 
be prohibitively expensive, and can often cost women and couples thousands 
of dollars to conceive.80 The problem is amplified by the fact that it often 
takes multiple attempts for an artificial insemination to take, with costs 
accumulating for each attempt. Additionally, insurance in many states would 
not cover artificial insemination from private donors unless a woman can 
show that she has not been able to get pregnant.81 Such preclusive restrictions 
pose difficult challenges for women in same-sex relationships and for single 
women who wish to have children, as payments for the entire treatment are 
often required up front. When ultrasound monitoring and medication are 
added to the mix, costs can range up to $4,000.82 Meanwhile, at-home 
                                                             
79 Libby Kane, The Hidden Costs of Using a Sperm Donor, LEARNVEST 
(Feb. 4, 2012), http://www.learnvest.com/2012/02/the-hidden-costs-of-using-
a-sperm-donor/. Only about 40% of mothers report donor births despite the 
recommendation. 
80 See Tony Dokoupil, 'Free Sperm Donors' and the Women Who Want 
Them, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.newsweek.com/free-sperm-
donors-and-women-who-want-them-68233 (describing how the purchase of 
sperm alone can cost up to $2,000). 
81 Id. 
82 See Fertility treatment: Artificial insemination (IUI), BABY CENTER, 
http://www.babycenter.com/0_fertility-treatment-artificial-insemination-
iui_4092.bc?page=1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
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artificial insemination kits can cost as little as $16.99 and prove just as 
effective, if not more so, in many cases.83 
Aside from alleviating the costs of commercial sperm banks, using a 
known donor can provide would-be mothers with various psychological and 
personal benefits as well. For instance, conception can be easier when using a 
fresh donation instead of one that has been frozen and thawed. Fresh 
donations have a higher sperm count than frozen sperm, and in many cases, 
they live longer.84 While frozen samples live for only about six hours after 
being thawed, fresh donations can live for up to 36 hours.85 This lengthens 
the window period for insemination and allows for a higher likelihood of 
success outside of a clinical environment.86 
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits to using a known donor (and also 
one of the main reasons that women and couples choose to forgo commercial 
sperm banks) is that it provides donor children with the opportunity to know 
the identities of their biological fathers.87 This is an especially attractive 
                                                             
83 See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/Human-Artificial-
Insemination-Kit-Inseminations/dp/B00BEZY4NO (last visited Feb. 7, 
2014). It is worth noting that it is possible to successfully conceive using a 
kitchen turkey baster, which can cost as little as $1.19. See THE 
WEBSTAURANT STORE, http://www.webstaurantstore.com/nylon-turkey-
baster/672P816.html?utm_source=Shopzilla&utm_medium=cse&utm_campa
ign=Shopzilla+Campaign (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). More often than not, 
however, it is recommended that a disposable syringe from an artificial 
insemination kit be used instead. See BABYMED, http://www.babymed.com/ 
home-artificial-insemination-get-pregnant-turkey-baster-method (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2014). 
84 KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, http://knowndonorregistry.com/about/faq-
about-known-donors#why-would-someone-consider-using-a-private-known-
donor (last visited Feb. 7, 2014). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 See KNOWN DONOR REGISTRY, supra note 84. 
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option for couples who want the donor to play an active role in the life of the 
child. It also affords children and families certain advantages that are not 
available through anonymous donations from sperm banks. For instance, a 
child might want to know what his or her father looks like, or may just want 
to know his name and general background.88 Use of a known donor also 
provides children with the opportunity to have questions answered and to 
obtain access to medical and genetic information that might not be available 
from a commercial sperm bank.89 Sperm banks generally resist revealing their 
donors' identities, fearing that such openness would scare off potential new 
candidates.90 Even sperm banks that choose to reveal donor identities, 
however, will not do so until the child reaches 18 years of age.91 
The benefits of unassisted, private donation have not gone unnoticed by 
courts either. The court in Jhordan C., for instance, took particular note of 
both the high costs and privacy issues inherent in physician-assisted artificial 
insemination as opposed to conception in the privacy of one's home.92 The 
court characterized these concerns as such: 
It is true that nothing inherent in artificial insemination 
requires the involvement of a physician. Artificial 
insemination is, as demonstrated here, a simple 
procedure easily performed by a woman in her own 
home. Also, despite the reasons outlined above in favor 
of physician involvement, there are countervailing 
considerations against requiring it. A requirement of 
physician involvement, as Mary argues, might offend a 
woman's sense of privacy and reproductive autonomy, 
might result in burdensome costs to some women, and 
might interfere with a woman's desire to conduct the 
                                                             
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 See Dokoupil, supra note 80. 
91 Id. 
92 See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 393–94. 
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procedure in a comfortable environment such as her own 
home or to choose the donor herself.93 
C. Does State Resistance to Changes in Donor Statutes Reflect 
a Bias in Favor of Traditional Families and Against Same-
Sex Marriage? 
Some have argued that the Marotta case is strictly about Kansas seeking 
reimbursement for the assistance it provided to Schreiner and that is has 
nothing to do with discrimination against same-sex couples. Corey Whelan of 
the New York-based American Fertility Association, for example, does not 
fault the state for seeking funds from Marotta.94 Whelan, who counsels 
lesbian couples interested in having children and who also has a long 
standing practice of advising physician involvement in artificial insemination, 
says that this is not a homophobic issue, and that it is merely financially 
driven.95 In like manner, Mark Demaray, a Washington state-based attorney 
and past president of an organization for attorneys who handle assisted 
reproduction legal issues, says that the Kansas statute is a "commonsense 
law."96 According to Mr. Demaray, it is very common for women seeking 
artificial insemination to have to go through a doctor's office and get a sworn 
statement from the doctor that he or she performed the procedure.97 
Marotta and his attorney, Ben Swinnen, see things from a different 
perspective. Instead of saying it is a "commonsense law," Marotta believes 
the Kansas statute is outdated and that the state is lagging behind in modern 
                                                             
93 Id. 
94 See Hollingsworth & Hanna, supra note 1. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
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times.98 In an interview on a Boston talk show, he likened the statute to 
southern Jim Crow laws during the civil rights movement, saying that "just 
because a law is in the books doesn't mean it's right." Similarly, his attorney 
views the decision as a manifestation of the state's political agenda.99 Kansas 
voters approved a constitutional amendment in 2005 which outlawed same-
sex marriage,100 and Swinnen believes the donor statute acts as an 
enforcement mechanism because it precludes the state from acknowledging 
that the couple has a child.101 His theory has merit. While the statute clearly 
states that a donor is not the father when a physician is involved,102 it does 
not state that a donor must be the father when a physician is not involved. 
According to Swinnen, both the state's pursuit of funds from Marotta and the 
court's subsequent decision improperly read this inference into the law, a 
notion with which he disagrees.103 Additionally, Marotta says the state's 
interpretation of the law will have a chilling effect on donors who would 
otherwise be willing help out couples who wish to forgo the huge payments 
accompanying physician involvement.104 
Kansas' bias against same-sex marriage is evident in other legislation as 
well. In February of 2014, the Kansas House of Representatives 
overwhelmingly approved a measure protecting religious individuals, groups, 
                                                             
98 See Court to Sperm Donor: You Owe Child Support, HERE AND NOW 
WITH ROBIN YOUNG AND JEREMY HOBSON (Feb. 12, 2014), http:// 
hereandnow.wbur.org/2014/02/12/sperm-donor-child-support. 
99 See id. 
100 Hollingsworth & Hanna, supra note 10. 
101 See Court to Sperm Donor: You Owe Child Support, supra note 98. 
102 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208(f) (2013) ("The donor of semen 
provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman 
other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth father 
. . . unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman."). 
103 See Court to Sperm Donor: You Owe Child Support, supra note 98. 
104 Id. 
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and businesses that refuse services to same-sex couples, particularly those 
who are looking to get married.105 The proposed bill states: 
[N]o individual or religious entity shall be required by 
any governmental entity to do any of the following, if it 
would be contrary to the sincerely held religious beliefs 
of the individual or religious entity regarding sex or 
gender: (a) Provide any services, accommodations, 
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges; provide 
counseling, adoption, foster care and other social 
services; or provide employment or employment 
benefits, related to, or related to the celebration of, any 
marriage, domestic partnership, civil union or similar 
arrangement.106 
Critics say that once the bill is signed into law, the result will mark Kansas as 
the first state to legalize segregation of gay and straight people in almost all 
arenas of everyday life.107 Not only will business entities that turn away gay 
couples be immunized from lawsuits, but anyone who attempts to sue them 
for discrimination will have to pay their legal fees as well.108 
                                                             
105 See Ben Brumfield & Dana Ford, Kansas House passes bill allowing 
refusal of service to same-sex couples, CNN U.S. (Feb. 13, 2014, 7:59 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/02/13/us/kansas-bill-same-sex-services/. 
106 See H.B. 2453, 2014 Sess. (Kan. 2014). 
107 See Mark Joseph Stern, Kansas' Anti-Gay Segregation Bill Is an 
Abomination, SLATE MAG. (Feb. 13, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/outward/2014/02/13/kansas_anti_gay_segregation_bill_is_an_abominat
ion.html. Although the bill has not been signed into law as of the date of this 
note, it passed the state's Republican-dominated House by a vote of 72-49 and 
is anticipated to easily pass in the state's Republican-dominated Senate and 
signed into law by Governor Sam Brownback, a conservative Christian 
known for his public stance against same-sex marriage. See Brumfield & 
Ford, supra note 105. 
108 See Brumfield & Ford, supra note 105. 
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V. A PROGRESSIVE WAY FORWARD 
Despite Kansas' legislative balk to the country's push for equality, the 
growing acceptance of same-sex marriage in other states109 has created a need 
for more progressive laws that can accommodate alternative families. At the 
very core of the alternative family is the ability of lesbian couples to 
conceive, and as this note has shown, statutory laws requiring physician 
involvement in artificial insemination can present significant obstacles that 
inhibit this ability. Such laws stand in the way of the country's progress 
towards equal rights, and the call for reform in this very important aspect of 
American life is at an all-time high. At the same time, the public health risks 
that might accompany reform must be given equal, if not greater weight. If 
progress is to be made, steps must be taken responsibly with the interests of 
donor children at the forefront of the debate. 
In order to address these two conflicting concerns, this note recommends 
that states undertake a two-part legislative process. First, states that have not 
yet adopted the 2002 amendments to the UPA should enact legislation 
removing the physician requirement included in the 1973 UPA. When the 
2002 amendments to the UPA were enacted, the Commissioners made a 
conscious choice to remove the language referencing physician involvement 
in artificial insemination.110 This revision reflected a change in the 
Commissioner's interpretation of the word, "donor," to one that was broader 
and not subject to the complex and serious legal problems inherent in the 
1973 UPA.111 If states follow the lead of the Commissioners, more donors 
will choose to donate since the legal ramifications of child support 
                                                             
109 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Federal judge strikes down Va. ban on gay 
marriage, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 12:40 AM), http://www.washingtonpost 
.com/politics/federal-judge-strikes-down-va-ban-on-gay-marriage/2014/02/ 
13/c65b7674-9528-11e3-83b9-1f024193bb84_story.html. 
110 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702, 9B U.L.A. 355 cmt. (2000) 
(amended 2002) ("The new Act does not continue the requirement that the 
donor provide the sperm to a licensed physician."). 
111 See id. 
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obligations will be lifted. This will result in a positive step forward for same-
sex couples, as monetary barriers in the form of expensive fertility treatment 
and commercial sperm banks will substantially fall. 
Second, in order to mitigate the public health risks of accidental incest 
and the widespread passage of hereditary diseases, states should enact stricter 
regulations governing anonymous sperm donation as well as the number of 
donations that can be made per individual donor in a given geographic area. 
This could be accomplished by developing state donor registries and 
mandating registration for each private donation. One possibility worth 
considering comes from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, 
which suggests limiting a single donor to no more than 25 births per a 
population of 800,000.112 Another recommendation would be for states to 
institute restrictions on anonymous sperm donation that are similar to those in 
the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Finland, and Australia.113 While this note 
does not suggest a complete ban on anonymity, a mandate that requires ready 
access to a donor's genetic and medical information would provide children 
with beneficial information in making future medical decisions. 
                                                             
112 See Samantha Pfeifer, M.D. et al., Recommendations for gamete and 
embryo donation: a committee opinion, SOCIETY FOR ASSISTED 
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, http://www.sart.org/uploadedfiles/asrm 
_content/news_and_publications/practice_guidelines/guidelines_and_minimu
m_standards/2008_guidelines_for_gamete%281%29.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 
2014). 
113 See Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on 
Gamete Donor Anonymity and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 291, 292 (2013) (describing how "a growing movement of 
commentators is advocating a shift to an open identity model that would ban 
anonymity."). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Marotta lawsuit demonstrates that donors and would-be mothers 
should approach the practice of unassisted artificial insemination with the 
utmost care. As case law indicates, courts are reluctant to exhibit flexibility 
on matters of statutory interpretation regarding donor status. In states that 
have yet to adopt the language of the UPA's 2002 amendments, men who 
donate their sperm for use in artificial insemination without the involvement 
of a physician will most likely be considered legal fathers. Conversely, states 
that have adopted the language will likely regard them as donors. 
As same-sex marriage continues to gain widespread acceptance 
throughout the country, the law must adapt to accommodate changes in 
public policy. However, if states are to enact legislation that could lead to an 
increase in private sperm donation, they must also consider the public health 
issues that would arise in order to protect the well-being of children 
conceived through artificial insemination. Such needs can be met if state 
legislatures enact statutes akin to the 2002 amendments of the UPA and pass 
regulations that effectively track the activity of private sperm donors. Such 
reforms are important not only for donors and couples who wish to conceive, 
but they are also necessary in our country's march towards equality for all. 
